New empirical models of consumer demand that incorporate social preferences, observational learning, word-of-mouth or network effects have the feature that the adoption behavior of others in an agent's reference group − the "installed-base" − has a causal effect on his current adoption behavior. Estimation of such causal installed-base effects is challenging due to the potential for spurious correlation between the adoption of agents, arising from endogenous assortive matching into social groups (or homophily) and from the existence of unobservables across agents that are correlated. In the absence of experimental variation, the preferred solution is to control for these using a rich specification of fixed-effects, which is feasible with panel data. This paper shows that fixed-effects estimators of this sort are inconsistent in the presence of installed-base effects; in simulations, random-effects specifications perform even worse. The analysis reveals the tension faced by the applied empiricist in this area: a rich control for unobservables increases the credibility of the reported causal effects, but the incorporation of these controls introduces biases of a new kind in this class of models. The authors present two solutions: an instrumental variable approach, and a new bias-correction approach, both of which deliver consistent estimates of causal installed-base effects. The bias-correction approach is tractable in this context because the structure of the problem is exploited to solve analytically for the asymptotic bias of the installed-base estimator, and to incorporate it into the estimation routine. The empirical application to the adoption of the Toyota Prius Hybrid in California reveals evidence for social influence in diffusion, and demonstrates the importance of incorporating proper controls for the biases identified − implementing the bias correction reverses the sign of the measured installed-base effect. The authors also discuss implications of the results for identification of models in Marketing involving state dependence in demand, and incorporating discrete games of strategic interaction.
We investigate the measurement of causal installed-base effects in marketing models of consumer adoption. We use the term "installed-base" to refer to the set of agents in a user's reference group that have adopted the focal product or service. Agents may care about the adoption behavior of other users because others' actions or welfare directly affects their utility (social preferences); because adoption by others updates the users' beliefs about existence or attributes (observational learning); because feedback from others affects beliefs directly (word-of-mouth); because adoption by others affects the users' value of the product (network effects); or because some combination of these are at play. In Marketing parlance, these structural constructs have been summarily referred to as "contagion" or "social effects". An important goal of empirical models of consumer demand that incorporate contagion is to measure the causal effects of the installed-base on current adoption behavior. In addition, the sign of the installed-base effect may also be of independent interest: for instance, herd behavior (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992) may result in positive installed-base effects, while exclusivity or snob effects (Leibenstein, 1950 ) may result in negative installed-base effects. A firm may then be interested in whether the combination of potential herding, snobbery and desire for exclusivity result in net positive or negative social influence. These measures feed into the development of targeted marketing interventions (e.g. seeding key opinion leaders: Yoganarasimhan, 2012 ) and/or resource allocation decisions that exploit the measured contagion (e.g. penetration pricing in the presence of network effects: Kalish and Lilien, 1983) .
In spite of the importance for Marketing, measurement of causal installed-base effects from behavioral data has proven to be very challenging. Installed-base effects have formed the basis for the extensive aggregate diffusion literature in Marketing (Bass, 1969; Mahajan, Muller, and Bass, 1990) . This literature treats the entire population of past adopters as the reference group for a representative agent's product adoption decision. With access to more disaggregate data on consumer's social networks, the recent empirical literature has used a more nuanced view of the reference group, leveraging social networks based on self-elicitation (Kratzer and Lettl, 2009; Conley and Udry, 2010; Iyengar, van den Bulte, and Valente, 2010; Nair, Manchanda, and Bhatia, 2010) ; dorm/work location (Sacerdote, 2001; Dufflo and Saez, 2003; Sorensen, 2006) ; ethnic/cultural proximity (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Luttmer, 2000; Munshi and Myaux, 2006) ; or as in the current application, geographic location (Topa, 2001; Arzaghi and Henderson, 2007; Bell and Song, 2007; Manchanda, Xie, and Youn, 2008; Choi, Hui, and Bell, 2010; McShane, Bradlow, and Berger, 2010; Nam, Manchanda, and Chintagunta, 2010; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2011; Du and Kamakura, 2011) .
When the reference group is a subset of the population, the immediate concern that arises is one of self-selection: unobserved tastes that cause two individuals to select to be part of the same group (homophily), also may also cause them to behave similarly in product adoption behavior.
In the geographic case, the concern is of assortive sorting on unobservables of households into communities. For instance, it is possible that environmentally conscious households prefer to live in "green" communities; at the same time, it may be that ceteris paribus, households in green communities tend to adopt environmentally friendly automobiles like the Toyota Prius early.
Hence, an observed correlation in the data between a user's propensity to adopt a Prius and the installed-base of Prius adopters in his community could simply reflect sorting on unobserved environmental friendliness, and not a causal effect of the past adoption on current behavior. Similar concerns arise due to the presence of spatially and temporally correlated unobservables that make households behave similarly. For instance, Toyota's advertising activity or local promotions targeted at a community could generate correlation in the adoption behavior of community members, and generate clustering in spatial patterns of diffusion. If not controlled for, this could manifest itself as a spurious installed-base effect. Accounting for such correlated, but omitted unobservables has been established to be important to the inference of causal Marketing effects using both spatial (e.g., Bronnenberg and Mahajan, 2001) , and temporal (e.g., Rao, 1986) sources of variation in observational data. 1
It is now taken as fait accompli in the empirical literature that the credibility of measures of social influence rests on the extent to which these confounds are appropriately addressed. In the absence of experimental variation, researchers now typically include rich specifications of fixed or random effects in combination with panel data to control for these unobserved sources of correlation. Unfortunately, random effects that involve distributional assumptions suffer from specification biases if the distributional assumptions are incorrect. The validity of the paneldata random effects estimator also depends on the assumption of independence with included within-group covariates, which is difficult to reconcile with an omitted variables interpretation for unobservables. Fixed-effects address both these concerns; and consequently is a robust way to control for confounding unobservables. The fixed-effects provide a semi-parametric control for unobservables that assuage the misspecification concern, and allow for arbitrary patterns of correlation. In the Prius example, for instance, one may include zip-and-time fixed-effects to flexibly control for unobserved common shocks that may be both spatially and temporally correlated in an unknown way.
Unfortunately, we show that though attractive, fixed-effects estimators of this sort are inconsistent in the presence of installed-base effects. To understand the inconsistency, note that fixed effects estimators are identified off the within variation of the installed base from its mean 1 Manski (1993) pointed out a third confound that arises if the adoption decisions of agents in the community are simultaneously determined with that of past adopters. This is likely to be of lesser concern in the case of installed-base effects as consumers are assumed to condition on the adoption of their installed-base, which is taken as predetermined. Fundamentally, this requires that each adopting consumer is myopic, or alternatively, is forward-looking, but forms beliefs under the assumption he is "small" relative to the size of the adopting local community such that he anticipates his individual adoption decision will not significantly influence the adoption behavior of any one consumer in the future.
value within the zip-code. The construction of the installed base implies it is a function of past unobservable determinants of adoption within the zip-code. Because the installed-base is a function of persistent within unobservables by construction, the within variation of the installed base around its mean in a zip-code is in turn not independent of the within variation of the unobservable determinants of adoption around its mean within the zip-code. This violates the usual condition for consistency in the panel data model that the variation of the right-hand side variables be independent of the variation in the errors in the model. Another intuition for the inconsistency is that the future installed base is a function of current adoption in a location, implying current unobservables within a location are correlated with future installed base values. This violates the strict exogeneity condition required for the consistency of fixed effects estimators.
We investigate inference of installed-base effects in the context of a linear model. We derive the asymptotic distribution of the fixed-effects installed-base estimator and characterize the nature of the bias. As expected, random-effects do not ameliorate the issue: in our simulations, random-effects specifications perform even worse. These issues are amplified further in nonlinear models. Our analysis reveals the tension faced by the applied empiricist wishing to do careful work in this area: a rich control for unobservables increases the credibility of the reported causal effects, but the incorporation of these controls introduces biases of a new kind in this class of models. To our knowledge, this aspect has not been addressed in the past social effects literature.
Our analysis is related to, but conceptually distinct from the "dynamic panel data" literature which discusses the inconsistency generated by the presence of lagged dependent variables in models with fixed-effects or random effects (Nerlove, 1971; Nickell, 1981; Judson and Owen, 1999; Bun and Carree, 2005) . 2 In the spatio-temporal models of diffusion we consider, there are no lagged endogenous variables, but instead, lagged aggregations of past decisions made by other consumers are included as explanatory variables. This is the work-horse empirical model employed by the vast and burgeoning social effects literature.
We then discuss two solutions to addressing the bias: first, an instrumental variable (IV) approach similar to the one suggested in the dynamic panel data literature, and second, a new bias-correction approach, both of which deliver consistent estimates of causal installed-base effects in the context of a linear panel data model. The IV approach requires access to an exclusion restriction implying a variable that generates exogenous variation in the installed-2 It is easy to see that in the dynamic panel model, yit = νi + γyit−1 + it, with fixed-effect νi for unit i, first-differencing is problematic even if the innovations, it are IID: in the first-differenced model, yit − yit−1 = γ (yit−1 − yit−2) + ( it − it−1), the errors, ( it − it−1) are correlated with the included variable, (yit−1 − yit−2) . Clearly, random effects are more problematic because the assumption that νi is uncorrelated with the included variable, yit−1, is violated by construction. Similarly, the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator, yit −ȳi = γ (yit−1 −ȳi,−1) + ( it −¯ i), is inconsistent for γ because the mean differenced errors, ( it −¯ i) are correlated with the mean-differenced lags, the included variable, (yit−1 −ȳi,−1). Starting with (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981) and (Arellano and Bond, 1991) , it is common to use the history of laggedlevels and lagged-differences as instruments to address the inconsistency.
base. In practice, this variation may be hard to find (we discuss one approach below). On the other hand, the bias-correction approach is tractable in this context because we are able to exploit the structure of the problem to solve analytically for the asymptotic bias of the installedbase estimator, and to incorporate it into the estimation routine. While the conceptual idea of adjusting an estimator for its bias is not new to the econometric literature (e.g., Kiviet (1995) ), we believe we are the first to formally derive the bias correction and apply the estimator in the context of the installed base models we consider here. Bias-correction approaches have also been relatively unused in Marketing and in applied empirical work, more generally. The bias-correction approach utilizes an asymptotic approximation, and requires access to a large data-set. In practice, we expect this requirement to be met given the large data-sets Marketers now have access to; for example, our data contain about 11 Million observations on automobile purchases. Our approach also addresses a difficult issue with these large data-sets: while highfrequency data are increasingly available, often it is hard to find instrumental variables with equivalent variation (e.g., we may be able to identify a valid instrument, but its variation in the data is limited relative to the variation of the endogenous variables. Using these "weak IVs"
often deliver consistent but very imprecise estimates that limit their usefulness for applied work).
Our approach has the advantage of exploiting the size of the data, without the need to identify appropriate instruments. We present Monte Carlo simulations that establish the face validity and internal consistency of the approach in our context, and assess its performance relative to a series of alternative estimators.
The bias we identify arises from the nature of the within-variation of the installed-base variable, and is not removed by using alternative estimators like first-differencing (FD): when strict exogeneity is violated, FD is also inconsistent. In principle, one could develop a bias correction algorithm for an FD estimator as well. We consider the fixed-effects estimator because FD entails loss of one observation for each unit and is less efficient than fixed effects, especially when the unit-specific unobservables have little persistence. This is the expectation once we include a very rich specification of time-location fixed like our application. In these situations fixed effects is the more efficient estimator. Further, in unbalanced cases, FD requires that data exists in adjacent time periods while the fixed-effects estimator does not.
We then present an empirical application to studying social spillovers in the adoption of the We see strong spatial correlation in adoption patterns of the Prius which are suggestive of social spillovers operating over geography. The richness of our individual-level adoption data enable us to accommodate a rich set of controls for unobserved factors: we include a fixed-effect for each zip-quarter combination in the data (over 64,000 fixed-effects). We are not concerned much about over-fitting given the size of the dataset and the fact that we intend the model to be used more for measurement than for prediction. We specify the installed-base at the level of a zip code and month, and explore robustness to different levels of geographical aggregation, including the level of a city and county.
We find that the incorporation of fixed-effects is important to obtain a valid measure of the social effects. We further find that the correlation in the unobservables accommodated by the fixed-effects is not easily approximated by parametric specifications (e.g., multivariate normals), underscoring the importance of the flexible control. In general, we find that controls for homophily and correlated unobservables reduces the magnitude of the installed-base effects.
In our most general fixed-effects specification without the corrections we propose, we find that the installed-base effect becomes negative and significant, suggesting snob or exclusivity effects.
We discuss why this is spurious, and driven by the downward bias we identify. Controlling for this, we find evidence for positive and significant installed-base effects. The flip in the sign has economic consequences for marketers, and illustrates the practical consequences of the biases we identify for applied empirical work.
For the IV approach, we exploit an institutional feature of the Hybrid market that contagion across spatially co-located households likely occurs via visual observation of consumption. The institutional feature is that competing Hybrid vehicles such as the Honda Civic Hybrid were visually exact versions of their non-Hybrid versions. The identifying assumption is that on account of this aspect, Hybrid adoption of these other brands is not subject to social effects, and may be used as instruments for the Prius installed-base. We also use the installed-bases of flex-fuel vehicles as instruments ("flex-fuel" vehicles can use ethanol-blended gasoline). These identifying assumptions may not be valid, and may be falsified under alternative stories of spillover mechanisms. Hence, we also present estimates using our bias-correction approach. We find that the estimates of this approach correspond broadly to those obtained using the IV estimator in our empirical application. In addition, under this approach, the social effects are precisely estimated.
To assess robustness, we expect that social effects that operate via geographic proximity should dissipate when we define the network over larger geographic areas. We find that the estimated installed-base effects are indeed weaker when we define the network at the level of the city, and statistically insignificant when we define the network at the level of the county. These results are consistent with social effects that operate over geographic contiguity. Further, our estimator finds no social effects when applied to data on the adoption of the Honda Civic Hybrid, consistent with our a priori expectations. In our preferred specification for the Prius, the estimates imply that an additional 100 Toyota Prius cars in the zip code result in an incremental purchase of about one (exact 0.9963) Prius in a given month, a fairly large lift because it comes at little cost to the firm. Computing a long-run effect, we find that an intervention that adds x incremental Prius cars to a median zip code results in incremental sales of an additional x cars within a 70 month period, purely from the installed base effect (the exogenous addition could be the result of marketing interventions like Prius give-aways or penetration pricing, policies actually implemented by Toyota as discussed later). These numbers suggest installed-base effects are economically significant for the Prius, and illustrates the empirical feasibility of our approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we investigate the bias formally.
To develop intuition, we first discuss a model with installed-base as the only covariate, and then generalize the results for a model with other covariates, for cases where these covariates are exogenous and endogenous. We discuss IV and bias-correction approaches to addressing the bias. In section 2, we present our empirical application for the Hybrid automobile market. We present IV and bias-corrected approaches to obtain consistent estimates of the installed-base effect and conduct a series of robustness checks. Finally, we conclude in section 4.
1 Consistent Estimation of Installed-Base Effects
No Covariates other than Installed Base
We present the discussion in the context of a linear probability model in which the installed-base of past adopters in the local neighborhood of the consumer is the only included covariate (the analysis goes through with little change for other linear models). In the next subsection and in the Appendices, we discuss extensions to including additional covariates. Anticipating our empirical application, we assume that the analyst has access to individual-level data on the adoption of the focal product, which describes the location (zip code) of the individual, as well as the time of adoption (month). We will work with a conditional set-up, in which we model the probability an individual will buy the focal product (e.g, Toyota Prius) in a given month, conditional on the decision to buy a car that month. Specifying a conditional model enables us to abstract from modeling the hazard-rate of adoption, and to avoid specifying structural constructs relating to consumer price and quality expectations that affect the timing of adoption. A more detailed discussion of the use of a linear probability model, and of the conditional set-up is presented in section (2.3.1), where we discuss our empirical application.
Consider consumer i, who lives in market m i and has decided to purchase an automobile in time period (month) t i . Let y i denote whether consumer i buys the Toyota Prius in month t i .
Reflecting the conditional model, y i = 1 if the consumer buys the Prius and 0 if he buys another car (i.e., only individuals who buy a car during the observation window are included in the data-set. The choice of whether/when to buy a car is not modeled). Let the installed-base of the Toyota Prius in market m i and time period t i be denoted by X m i t i . Thus,
where N m i τ is the total number of people who purchase automobiles in market m i in time period τ . We specify the decision to buy a Prius is related to the installed-base according to a linear probability model,
Here, f m i q i is a fixed effect specified at the market-quarter level. The market-specific component of the fixed effect controls for unobserved market specific characteristics on which sorting may occur, thereby controlling for across-market selection (or homophily). The time-period specific fixed-effects control flexibly for unobserved time-trends that may generate co-movement in adoption over time thereby controlling for spurious temporal correlation. Here, we allow a very general specification in which the unobservables over time are also allowed to be different for each market in a general way (market specific time-period fixed-effects). This is possible because we observe hundreds of individuals making purchase decisions for each market-month combination. Since the installed-base X m i t i is the same for all consumers in market m i and at time t i , the fixed effect cannot be specified at level of m i and t i . Therefore, we specify the fixed effect at the level of market and an aggregation of time. In the empirical application, this aggregation is at the level of the quarter. Thus, we include a fixed-effect for each market-quarter combination. Additionally, in some specifications, we also add fixed effects for month-of-thequarter that are common across zip codes. This results in over 64,000 fixed-effects, and is one of the most comprehensive set of controls considered in the related literature.
In Equation (2) above, β, which is the parameter of interest, is the installed-base effect, and ε i is the observation specific unobservable. We assume that since we include a sufficiently rich set of fixed effects, ε i are independent and identically distributed across consumers, markets and time. The IID assumption also implies that the installed-base X m i t i is independent of ε i . Least Squares estimation of the above model is equivalent to the mean differenced estimator obtained by subtracting the means of both sides of Equation (2) 
whereȳ m i q i ,X m i q i andε m i q i are the means of the respective variables taken over all the N m i q i observations within market m i and quarter q i . Thus,
where we use the definition of the installed-base in Equation (1) to obtain Equation (5). Assume that there are N consumers observed in the data, and T time periods per quarter.
The within-estimator of the social effectβ, is obtained as,
Proposition 1. The within-estimatorβ is inconsistent, and the asymptotic bias is negative.
Proof. We present the proof by computing the probability limit ofβ as N → ∞, holding the number of observations within each zip code-quarter (i.e.
The proof is constructive as this will feed into the development of our bias-corrected estimator. Substituting
It follows from Slutsky's Theorem (henceforth ST) and the Mann Wald Continuous Mapping Theorem (henceforth MWCMT) that,
and from Khintchine's weak law of large numbers that,
The denominator B in Equation (10) is non-zero by construction, hence inconsistency of the within-estimatorβ is related to the fact that the expectation in the numerator A is non-zero even with an infinite number of consumers (N ). We can write A as the sum of four terms,
Consider the first term. It follows from the IID assumption that, E [X m i t i ε i ] = 0. For the second term, we use (1) and (6) to get,
To evaluate this, consider observations in the first period of the quarter. First, note that the installed-base for the first period includes purchases only in periods before the start of the quarter q i . Second,ε m i q i contains only ε j terms for observations in that quarter. Hence, the expectation E [X m i t iε m i q i ] = 0 for these observations. For observations in the second time period, there will be as many y i ε i terms as there are observations in the first period, since the y terms for the first period enter the installed-base for all observations in the second period and will be multiplied by the corresponding ε terms contained inε m i q i . For the third period of the quarter, there will be as many y i ε i terms as there are observations in the first and second periods and so on. Assuming that there are no systematic differences in the number of observations across periods -this is not necessary, though it makes the notation simpler -the proportion of observations each period is 1/T , and N m i q ii = nT where n is the number of observations within a time period. Therefore, the conditional expectation is,
The unconditional expectation is then,
With the analysis at a monthly level (i.e. T = 3) and assuming no systematic differences in the number of observations in different months of the quarter, we have the second term is,
Now consider the third term in Equation (11). We can compute,
To evaluate this, noting that y i ⊥ ε j , i = j, we need only focus on those terms in the expansion of this expectation which contain y i ε i . Consider an ε i in the first period. None of the X m j t j (installed-base) terms for the first period contain the corresponding y i term, but each of the installed-base terms for the subsequent periods till T contains a corresponding y i term. Thus, for every observation in the first period, there are (T − 1) n terms of the form y i ε i . Extending this logic, the expectation conditional on an observation given period t is,
The unconditional expectation is,
With analysis at the monthly level, T = 3, and therefore, E X m i q i ε i = σ 2 ε 3 . Finally, the fourth term can be evaluated using a similar logic. The conditional expectation of the fourth term given period t is,
This gives the unconditional expectation as,
With analysis at the month level, this expectation is
. Putting all four terms together,
Finally, defining B ≡ σ 2 X , we get,
This is the first result, establishing the inconsistency of the within-estimator for installed-base effects. Further, it establishes that the asymptotic bias is always negative and its magnitude is proportional to the ratio of the error variance and the within-quarter variance of the installedbase. We will exploit these results to develop our bias-correction estimator of β.
To see the next step, note that the bias ofβ in Equation (21) is a function of the variance of the unobservables, σ 2 ε . Perhaps, we can estimate this bias term by estimating σ 2 ε ? Unfortunately, we show below that the standard panel-data estimator for σ 2 ε is also inconsistent.
Proposition 2. The estimator, s 2 for σ 2 ε is inconsistent, and the asymptotic bias is negative.
Proof. The estimator s 2 given by,
where M is the total number of observations in the data, N M Q is the number of market-quarter combinations in the data (also equal to the number of fixed-effects) and K is the number of regressors, in this case 1.
The i th element of the residual vectorε is given by,
This is the residual in the differenced equation. Moving to vector notation, and noting that
Thus, s 2 is,
Given that
Thus the probability limit with infinite N is,
Hence, the estimator of the error variance is inconsistent as well. Further, the bias is negative.
Adding Exogenous Covariates
We now augment the model to include exogenous covariates other than the installed-base. Let the new covariate vector be denoted by Z.
Proposition 3. The within-estimatorβ for the installed base effect β, the estimatorγ for the coefficient for the exogenous covariate γ and the estimator s 2 for the error variance σ 2 ε are all inconsistent and the bias terms are,
Proof. See Appendix A.
Adding Endogenous Covariates
We consider the case where the covariates Z are endogenous, and we have a set of exogenous instruments S that are correlated with Z but not with the random error ε. LetẐ be the predicted value of Z from a linear projection of Z on S.
Proposition 4. The within-estimatorβ for the installed base effect β, the estimatorγ for the coefficient for the endogenous covariate γ and the estimator s 2 for the error variance σ 2 ε are all inconsistent.
Proof. See Appendix B, where the exact expressions for the bias terms are also presented.
Discussion
The results above show that the magnitude of the bias in the installed base effect is a function of the error variance and the within market-quarter variance of the installed-base and the included covariates. With positive social influence and assortive sorting, we expect that not controlling for unobservables will result in overstating social effects (positive bias).
At the same time, the results imply that controlling for unobservables using fixed-effects will understate any positive social effects (negative bias). The combination of these opposing biases can manifest itself in a given data-set in a net positive or net negative way. Credible measurement of social effects requires addressing both issues. Further, covariate effects are also biased, even when covariates are exogenous. The bias depends on the sign and magnitude of the within covariance between the covariates and the installed-base (bias is increasing in the covariance).
This result implies that researchers should be cautious in interpreting the effects of time-varying variables like targeted marketing in panel-data models with lagged endogenous variables and unobserved heterogeneity, because the within variation of such marketing variables is likely strongly correlated with the within-unit variation of lagged endogenous variables like installed bases and past purchases.
Two Solutions

Instrumental Variables Approach
The first solution is to find an instrument that is correlated with the installed-base, but uncorrelated with the included errors. While conceptually simple, this is difficult in practice, as it is hard to find exogenous variation that shifts the installed-base over time but holds current adoption fixed. We present two potential instrumental variables strategies in our empirical application, which are based on specific stories about the mechanism of social contagion. Unfortunately however, these stories are not testable with available observational data. In other contexts, the instruments may be weak, and may not have enough power to measure the installed-base effect precisely. Hence, it is preferable to have other practical methods to address the bias in addition to the IV strategy.
Bias-Correction Approach with Exogenous Covariates
The basis for the second approach is the set of asymptotic results in section (1.2). The structure of the problem has the feature that the bias results from the correlation between the mean differenced installed-base and the mean differenced error. Exploiting this allows us to characterize the magnitude of the basis as a function of quantities that are either observed or can be estimated.
To understand the procedure, recall from Equation (28) that,
Thus, the asymptotic bias is a function of σ 2 ε and σ 2 XM Z X . The latter quantity is a function of the data and can be computed directly. Hence, provided we have a consistent estimate for σ 2 ε , we could find the exact magnitude of the asymptotic bias. We could then find the bias-corrected estimate for β as,β =β + 5 9
The intuition is simple: we adjust the estimate with an estimate of the bias. However, in order to find the adjustment term, we need consistent estimates of the variance of the disturbance, σ 2 ε . For this, we rely on the asymptotic bias in the estimates from the within-regression of this quantity, which we computed in Equation (30) earlier. We reproduce that result here for
ZZ Σ ZX The right-hand side is a function of σ 2 ε and a set of quantities that can all be computed directly from the data. The left hand side is the estimate of the error variance for a large data-set (large N ). Then, this implicitly defines a quadratic equation for σ 2 ε . Thus, we can find a consistent estimate for the error variance by solving the above equation for σ 2 ε . This idea is similar to panel-data approaches for estimating the variance components in the FGLS estimation of the random effects model (see for instance, Greene 1997, page 628) 
We can compute r directly from the data. Thus, estimator for σ 2 ε is obtained by solving the following quadratic equation in σ 2 ε ,
A solution to the above equation always exists whenever r 2 > 4rs 2 . Lack of existence of a solution is unlikely to be a binding issue in practice as with large samples, we expect the variance in the installed-base σ 2 X is a large relative to s 2 (especially as the dependent variable of the equation for which s 2 is estimated is either 0 or 1). In our simulations over a wide range of parameter settings and in our empirical exercise, we find that this leads to a situation where r > 4s 2 .
A second issue is that there are two roots. The larger of the two roots (
usually an unrealistically large number (note that the dependent variable, y i is binary). In our
Monte Carlo analysis, we found that invariably the viable estimator is,
Once we have the estimateσ 2 ε , we can plug it into the expression for the bias-corrected estimator β in Equation (31) to obtain consistent estimates of the installed-base effect. Thus,
Similarly, the estimator for the coefficients for the exogenous covariates can be estimated using the following bias correction estimator,
The standard errors of the bias-corrected estimates can be obtained by a bootstrap procedure, which we employ in our empirical application.
Bias-correction approach with Endogenous Covariates
When the covariates Z are endogenous, the procedure described in section 1.4.2 cannot be directly used. We discuss a modified two-stage approach with bias correction that gives us consistent estimates. For this, we utilize the asymptotic results presented in section 1.3 and Appendix B.
Suppose we have exogenous instruments S for the endogenous covariate Z. In the first stage, we find the regression coefficients∆ for the following multivariate regression,
whereZ is the mean-differenced covariate as before. We then find the fitted value of the covariate, Z = S∆. After this, the approach is very similar to that described in section 1.4.2 above, except thatZ is substituted byẐ. Thus, in the second stage, estimates are found for the parameters using the equation,ỹ =Xβ +Ẑγ +ε
Then, the asymptotic bias for the various parameters are estimated using the results in section 1.3. First a consistent estimate of the error variance is found using,
where,
A consistent estimator for the installed bias effect is then,
and that for the coefficients for the endogenous covariates is,
Finally, standard errors are obtained using a bootstrap procedure, that accounts for both the first stage and second stage of this procedure.
Monte Carlo Simulations
We now discuss the results of a series of Monte Carlo simulations we conducted to investigate the empirical strategies presented above and to assess the performance of alternative estimators.
Research Design The research design for our simulations is as follows. First, we assume the sample is drawn from N m zip codes, Nuarters and the lowest time period in the data is a month. In each month, we observe N purchase decisions. For the simulations reported below, we set N m = 100, N q = 3 and N = 30. For each zip code-quarter combination, we generate a fixed effect f m i q i from a normal distribution with a variance σ 2 f . Errors ε i are then drawn from a standard normal distribution (probit specification). A scalar exogenous covariate Z i is drawn from a normal distribution with mean m Z + ρf m i q i and standard deviation σ 2 Z . The mean of this distribution allows for correlation between the fixed effect and the covariate Z i . That covariates are correlated with the fixed effects is the default presumption for the researcher. When the correlation ρ is non-zero, the fixed-effects have an "omitted variables" interpretation. Finally, the coefficient β for the installed-base X and γ for the exogenous covariate Z are varied across different simulations. The latent propensity of a consumer to purchase is defined as,
The dependent variable, y i , are simulated by first setting the installed-bases in the first period to 0 in all zip codes. Then, each observation in the first period is simulated as,
The installed-bases for each zip code for the second period are then set to the aggregations of the choices (y i ) of all observations in the first period in that zip code (i.e. using Equation 1). Second period choices are simulated next, and analogously for subsequent periods. Thus, synthetic data are generated using a probit model, with fixed effects drawn from a random distribution, an installed-base variable constructed using observations in the periods up to the focal period, and other covariates drawn from a random distribution. Further, the covariates are correlated with the fixed effect in some simulations. The parameter values are chosen so as to closely match our empirical application to the adoption of the Toyota Prius, specifically to obtain similar ranges of values for the dependent variable y i and installed base X m i t i as in the case of the Toyota Prius.
For ease of reference, we collect the distributions from which various variables are drawn here,
Finally, in some simulations, we draw the fixed effects from a gamma distribution instead of a normal distribution.
Results We then run a series of alternative estimators on the above simulated data-set. These include linear models estimated using a OLS regression without fixed or random effects, a random effects Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression, GLS with fixed effects separately specified for zip code and quarters, GLS with fixed effects specified for each zip code-quarter combination, and random effects probit and random effects logit models. Since we are comparing models which the parameters themselves are not directly comparable, we compare marginal effects to assess performance. The standard errors of the marginal effects are computed using the delta method. Table 2a shows the results of the first set of Monte Carlo simulations. The first row shows the baseline simulation, where parameter values are assumed, fixed effects are drawn from a normal distribution and data generated from a probit model. Further, the installed-base effect and the correlation between the fixed effect and the covariate is set to zero. We see in this case that all models do well in recovering the true effect, with the truth within the 95% confidence intervals of the estimates. We also see the fixed effects linear probability model does as well as the probit and logit models in recovering the effects when the true data generating process is a probit. So with a rich set of fixed effects, the potential misspecification concern from using a linear model seems minimal.
In the second row, we keep everything the same as the baseline simulation, but allow the fixed effects to be correlated with the covariate in the data generating process (i.e. ρ = 0, the default presumption). We see this correlation biases the results of all models except the most general fixed effects model. This aspect is very significant when the installed-base variable is included in the model, as then, a correlation is induced between the included installed-base and the individual effect by construction. In the third row, we ask how the assumption of normal random effects biases estimation when the individual effects are in truth drawn from a skewed gamma distribution with shape and scale parameters fixed so the variance and mean of the fixed effect is the same as that in the previous two simulations. Looking at Table 2a we find the linear models do well in recovering the true effect (no misspecification), but the nonlinear random effects probit and logit models suffer from significant specification bias (e.g., the marginal effect of Z in the probit model is biased upward by about 28%, to 2.9832 from 2.3211, the truth).
We now report on simulations with the installed-base effect turned on, reported in Table   2b . As before, we generate data using a probit model, and estimate the effects using various estimators -linear OLS without individual effects, random effects, separate zip and quarter fixed effects, zip-quarter fixed effects, and nonlinear models including random effects probit and random effects logit. We also report on the performance of our proposed bias correction estimator. We compare the marginal effect of the installed-base variable across the models, and compute the standard errors of the marginal effects using the delta method.
The first row shows that OLS is biased, due to both misspecification as well as the absence of controls for homophily and correlated unobservables. Allowing for fixed or random effects reduces the magnitude of the installed-base effect from the OLS case as expected. Consistent with the results in section (1.2), the fixed and random effect estimates are biased downward.
The nonlinear models do better in recovering the true effect, though they are still significantly different from the true value. The bias-corrected estimator locates the truth within its 95% confidence interval.
In the next row, we switch off the effect of the exogenous covariate in the simulations and find similar results: the bias corrected estimator is again the only one locating the truth within the 95% confidence interval. In rows 3 and 4, we vary the strength and sign of the installed-base effect. In row 4, we allow the true data to reflect a "snob" effect (installed-base effect is negative), and in row 5, we allow for stronger social effects (installed-base effect is fixed at a higher positive level than the base simulation). Finally in the last row, we alter the distribution of the fixed effects to a skewed gamma distribution instead of a normal distribution. In each of these cases,
we that all considered estimators except the bias-corrected estimator are unable to recover the truth precisely. Notably, the fixed effect estimate is negatively biased as expected. Overall, we also see the bias-correction estimator does remarkably well.
2 Empirical Application
Background
As described earlier, our empirical application is to the automobile industry. We study social Exclusivity or snob effects (Leibenstein, 1950 ) may also play a role, if consumers desired to buy cars different from those owned by others in their neighborhoods. Hence, the sign and magnitude of the overall social effect are empirical questions to be answered with data.
Data Description
We have access to an unusually detailed disaggregate data-set on automobile purchases. The data-set was acquired from R. L. Polk and Co., a major provider of data to the US automobile industry. The data-set contains individual-level information on all automobiles registered in the state of California between January 2001 and March 2007, and includes time periods from before the introduction of the Toyota Prius in the US market. We observe the details of the automobile registered, including its make, model, fuel-type, whether it was a Hybrid vehicle, the zip code of residence of the owner to whom it was registered, the month and year it was registered, whether it was registered to an individual or a business, whether it was part of a fleet (e.g. of a car rental company), and in the case of individuals, some details about the owners' household income (see Shriver, 2010 for an application using similar R. L. Polk data). Each observation in the data is an individual-level registration event. Every registration is included.
First, we discuss some summary statistics from the data. There are 11.1 million observations in the full data-set: to be clear, 11.1 million vehicles were registered in the state of California during the data period. Of these, about 10 million observations involve automobiles registered by individual buyers, and the rest involve institutional buyers, including businesses and corporate entities, Government agencies and fleet purchasers such as car rental firms. A total of 186,276
Hybrid vehicles were registered in California during the period of the data-set, of which 172,094
were registered to individuals. Of these, 102,949 (both individual and institutional) and 95,278
(individual only) constituted Toyota Prius cars. Thus, the Toyota Prius thus an overall adoption rate of 0.95% (i.e. 0.95% of all automobiles registered in California during this period were Toyota Prius). In the last month in the data-set, i.e. March 2007, 3.38% of all automobiles were Priuses.
We first explore spatial patterns in the diffusion of the Prius. Figure 1a shows The figures demonstrate that there is spatial clustering in adoption rates. This pattern is consistent with social effects but is not conclusive. The first-order alternative explanations include in particular, homophily and correlated unobservables. Hence, controls for these factors are important for attributing such clustering to social effects. Since there is no experimental variation in the installed-bases in local geographies, we would need to econometrically control for these confounding factors.
Empirical Strategy
Data Specific Decisions
We first discuss decisions we made in implementing our empirical strategy. These decisions reflect the nature of the data and the specifics of our application.
Level of aggregation
The lowest level of geography identified in our data is a zip code, and the lowest time interval is a month; hence, we specify the installed-base at the level of a zip code and month. Later, in checking for robustness of our specification, we allow for different levels of geographical aggregation, including the level of a city and a county.
We also need to decide the level at which fixed-effects may be specified. Since the installedbase in our analysis is at the zip code-month level, we cannot include fixed-effects at the level of zip code-month. We could specify separate zip code and month fixed-effects. However, this set of controls would not control for marketing variables that vary at a local level over time (e.g. the varying availability of Toyota Prius cars as it was rolled out across its dealer network, local-level marketing activities, zip specific trends). Therefore, we include market and timespecific fixed-effects in our specification. We aggregate to zip code-quarter fixed-effects due to collinearity with the installed-base. However, in order to allow for variation amongst months within quarters, we also include fixed-effects for the first or second month of the quarter. This could, for instance, control for variation in availabilities across months within a quarter, quarterly sales quotas for dealers and their sales-persons, etc. The identifying assumption is that withinquarter unobserved factors that affect adoption are common across zip-codes for a given month, and that any other unobserved local-level marketing factors vary across quarters but not within quarters. We test the robustness of this identifying assumption by varying the definition of a quarter (estimating models with the first quarter starting in February or March instead of January, and similarly for other quarters). We found no material changes in our results across these different specifications. Finally, we also include a set of dummy variables for the income group that the consumer belongs to as controls. We believe this is one of the richest set of controls provided in the literature so far, and helps mitigate concerns about unobservables to the extent possible.
Why not Random Effects? As discussed above, random effects are not easy to handle in the model since the consistency of random effects estimators depend on the assumption of the orthogonality of these effects to all covariates in the model. By construction, random effects and the installed-base are not uncorrelated, since the installed-base is the aggregation of purchase decisions of other consumers who share the same random effect. By contrast, panel data fixedeffects approaches treat the fixed-effects as parameters to be estimated, and do not depend on assumption about their orthogonality to observed covariates. Maximum-likelihood estimation of the random-effects model is possible, but is sensitive to misspecification if the true distribution of unobservables differs from the ones assumed as we demonstrated in our Monte-Carlo simulations.
With fixed-effects, the control for unobservables is semi-parametric, addressing this concern.
Linear Specification When there are a large number of markets and/or a large number of time periods, specifying fixed-effects for a nonlinear model using dummy variables quickly becomes infeasible. For instance, there are over 2000 zip codes in the California data, spread over 96 months (8 years). Thus, there are thousands of fixed-effects to estimate, and maximum likelihood for a binary logit or probit model would be infeasible (also, see section 3 where we discuss the challenges of including these in the context of nonlinear models). Hence, we adopt a linear model for our inference. Above, we reported on Monte Carlo simulations which shows the linear probability model with a rich specification of fixed-effects performs well in approximating social effects generated from underlying nonlinear data generating processes. Note that the parameters of the Monte Carlo simulations were chosen to approximate the distributions of data in the Prius application. The linear specification may predict probabilities that lie outside the [0, 1] interval and hence may not be the preferred model for predictive purposes, but is a reasonable model for estimating causal effects and for measuring the incremental effects from changes in the installedbase because it differences out the levels. This is the case in our application.
Conditional Model An observation in our data-set is a car that was registered, and while we know where and when it was registered, we have only limited details on who. In other words, we do not see repeated observations for a particular customer, and we do not know whether the customer owns other cars, or whether the focal car is a replacement for another car. Our view is that the timing of automobile adoption is a dynamic replacement problem, and a timing model is not credible without having access to the key state variable driving the dynamics (i.e. the current car the individual is replacing from). Hence, our data do not allow us to credibly model the decision of the consumer of whether to buy an automobile or not. Hence, we condition on the fact that the consumer buys an automobile in that month, and our dependent variable is whether that automobile is the Toyota Prius or not. While we do not have a panel of individuals for which we see repeated purchases, our data are of a panel nature, in the sense that for a given geography (zip code) and a given time (month), we see many individuals buying automobiles.
This allows us to set up a rich specification of fixed-effects as described earlier. Our model is essentially measuring the Prius choice elasticity with respect to the installed base variable, conditional on category purchase. Conceptually, this is equivalent to omitting the "no-purchase" option in a standard choice-model. This implies we will be able to estimate only the conditional elasticity of Prius choice with respect to the installed base, and not the unconditional elasticity.
Empirical Specification and Estimation
Incorporating these considerations, the empirical specification we use is,
The notation is carried over from section (1), i.e.,
• y i is consumer i's decision of whether to purchase a Toyota Prius or not, conditional on purchasing an automobile in zip code m i and month t i , taking the value 1 if the Prius is purchased and 0 otherwise.
• X m i t i is the installed-base of the Toyota Prius in zip code m i and month t i and is the total number of Prius cars purchased in the zip code from its introduction up to and including month t i . It is defined in Equation (1).
• f m i q i is the zip code-quarter specific fixed effect.
• Z i is a set of other controls including income dummies and dummies for the month within the quarter (i.e. month 1, 2 or 3 within a quarter).
• ε i is an independent and identically distributed unobservable.
• β and γ are parameters to be estimated. In some specifications, we also use the installed-bases of flex-fuel vehicles (which can use gasoline blended with ethanol as fuel) as instruments. The argument for using these as instruments is similar to that of using installed-bases of other Hybrids -the installed-bases of flex-fuel vehicles and the Toyota Prius Hybrid within a community could be correlated due to common factors such as green consciousness, but since flex fuel vehicles are versions of existing vehicles with no significant outward differences, these installed-bases are difficult for consumers to track and may be excluded from the demand equation for the Toyota Prius.
IV Strategy
Clearly, these IVs may not be valid if the underlying stories that motivate them are untrue.
Hence, we also compare these results to our bias-corrected estimates.
Results
In this sub-section, we report the results of our empirical analysis. In order to demonstrate the biases we have outlined, we first estimate a set of naive regressions. The results of these regression are reported in combination. This provides a strong set of controls for homophily and correlated unobservables, but the installed-base effect is negative and significant in this case.
It is tempting to infer these as evidence of snob effects or exclusivity, but this estimate now reflects a negative bias in the estimates for the installed-base effect demonstrated in section 1.
Thus, it might be that the true causal installed-base effect is positive, but the bias overwhelms this positive effect.
Instrumental variable regression estimates
In Table 3 , we report the instrumental variable estimates. Model IV1 includes zip code-quarter fixed-effects and instruments for the installed-base using (the levels of) installed-bases for the Honda Civic Hybrid, other Hybrid cars and flex-fuel vehicles. We find that the effect is positive and significant. We also estimate the model using only the installed-bases of flex fuel vehicles (model IV2). We find it leads to fairly similar estimates as model IV1.
Bias-corrected estimates
The bias-corrected estimator starts by finding the within-estimate for the model with fixedeffects. In other words, we specify the same model as before, but compute the OLS estimates for the mean-differenced model. We then use the estimates to compute the asymptotic biascorrected estimates as described earlier.
We use the fixed-effects model (Model N3) in Table 2 for the bias-corrected estimator. The estimate for the installed-base effect in the fixed effects model without the bias-correction is -0.0010268, i.e., negative. 4 In order to compute the asymptotic bias in the fixed effects estimator, we first need to find consistent estimates of the error variance. For this, we solve the quadratic equation (34), using the smaller of the two roots. The estimate of σ 2 ε so computed is 0.009212. Plugging this value back in the equation for the bias-corrected installed-base effect estimator (equation 35) gives us a corrected value of the estimate at 0.0001683. The corrected estimates, along with corrected standard errors are given in Table 6 , where we also present the IV estimates discussed earlier, for comparison. The standard errors are constructed using a bootstrap which accounts for the uncertainty associated with computing the error variance for the bias-correction. The bias-corrected estimate of the installed-base effect is close to that obtained using the instrumental variables approach (model IV1). We also report the bias-corrected estimates for the other parameters using the estimator in equation (36) in Table 6 . Note that while there is a significant difference in some of the parameters between the fixed effects estimator (model N3) in Table 2 and the IV estimator (say model IV1) in Table 3 , the bias corrected estimates and IV estimates reported in Table 6 are remarkably close. For instance, the effects for M onth2 and M onth3 show a sign reversal between the fixed effects estimates on the one hand, and the bias corrected and IV estimates on the other, underscoring the importance of controlling for the endogeneity for learning the correct effect of the exogenous covariates as well.
That the bias-correction results in the most change in these covariates is as expected, because as discussed earlier, the bias in the coefficients of the exogenous covariates is likely to be the highest for those variables which have a strong within correlation with the installed base. Since installed base is non-decreasing within a zip-quarter, the month dummies are strongly correlated with that variable by construction. This intuition extends to other variables of interest.
To interpret the economic significance of the estimate, note that the estimated installedbase coefficient measures the effect of an additional Toyota Prius in the installed-base on the conditional probability of the purchase of a Toyota Prius by a focal consumer, given that he purchases an automobile. Given that on average 59.2 automobiles are purchased in a zip code within a month, the estimate implies that an additional 100 Toyota Prius cars in the zip code results in an incremental purchase of about one (exact 0.9963) Prius in a given month. This is a fairly large installed base effect, given that these additional sales come with no incremental costs for the firm.
To interpret the long-run significance of the effect, we evaluate the extent to which the installed base effect influences the diffusion of the car over time. We run a simulation corresponding to a thought experiment in which at period 0, every zip code sees an exogenous addition of 100 Toyota Prius cars, and there are no purchases of the car in subsequent periods other than those caused by the installed base effect. The goal is to recover the incremental effect in period T of the exogenous addition to the installed-base in period 0 (the exogenous addition could be the result of marketing interventions like Prius give-aways or penetration pricing, policies actually implemented by Toyota as discussed below). As shown earlier, in period 1, on average 0.9963 Toyota Prius cars are purchased in the zip code at the margin due to the installed base effect.
At the end of period 1, the installed base is then 100.9963. We then compute how many Toyota Prius cars would be purchased in period 2 due to the effect of this new installed base. We find that by the end of the first year, 12.6 cars are purchased due to the installed base effect. The cumulative number of cars purchased due to the effect goes up to 26.9 by the end of the second year, 42.9 by the end of the third year, 60.9 by the end of the fourth year and 81.3 by the end of the fifth year. The initial installed base of 100 is doubled by the end of 70 months (to 200.2) purely through the social effect. These numbers demonstrate the installed base effect is of non-trivial economic consequence in the diffusion of the Prius.
Finally, we also describe the spatio-temporal patterns implied by the zip code-quarter fixed effects obtained using the estimates from model N3. We estimate the fixed effect for each zip code-month combination, by first obtaining the zip code-quarter fixed effect (computed as the difference between the zip code-quarter mean of the dependent variable and its predicted value using the regression estimates), and then adding the estimated month fixed effects. First, we look at the temporal patterns in the data. Figure 3a depicts box plots for the distributions of fixed effects across zip-codes for the various months in the data. We see the fixed effects are generally increasing over months, though there is a significant variance across zip codes in temporal growth. The spread of the distribution is changing over time. It is clear these are hard to capture by a priori specifying a parametric random effects specification. We also document a high degree of temporal dependence as shown in Figure 3b , which presents the temporal autocorrelation function for the fixed effects.
We next look at the spatial patterns in the fixed effects. Figure 4a presents a three-dimensional scatter plot of the fixed effects for various zip codes, plotted against the latitudes and longitudes of the zip code centroids. We see the fixed effects are strongly correlated in space, with larger values for zip codes with higher latitudes and longitudes (in absolute value). Further, the correlation is non-systematic. Analogous to the time dimension, it is hard to capture these by specifying a parametric spatial random effects specification. To obtain a sense for where the unobserved covariation is spread geographically, we also depict the spatial patterns in a temperature map of the mean fixed effects for each zip code, overlaid on a map of the state of California (i.e., the map shows fixed effects averages across months for each zip code). In Figure   4b , the color for each zip code represents the level of the mean fixed effect for that zip code. The colors range from blue, representing the lowest levels of the fixed effects through red, representing the highest levels. Mirroring the patterns in the raw data (Figures 1b through 1h) , we find that the fixed effects are highest in the San Francisco Bay Area, with those in the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas being somewhat lower. The lowest levels are in the smaller cities and rural areas of the state. However, even within these different regions, there is considerable spread in the levels of the fixed effects. Further, we see the spatial correlation is not fully explained by inter-zip code distance. We see the fixed effects are similar within a metropolitan area, where zip codes are very close to each other, but also similar for neighboring zip codes in rural areas, where distances are much greater. This suggests we cannot capture these spatial dependence's as simple, parametric functions of distance. Finally, we compute spatial autocorrelations functions using the "Moran's I" measure of similarity, assuming uniformly distributed distance classes.
Figures 4c depicts the spatial ACF-s, and reveals a high degree of spatial correlation.
Finally, we also test whether there is evidence of any additional persistence in the residuals, to assess the extent to which our fixed effects have controlled for unobservables that affect adoption. Figure 5 presents temporal and spatial ACF plots for the residuals. We find there is little remaining temporal persistence in the residuals (left panel), and that the spatial persistence dies out rapidly as well (right pane).
To summarize, the temporal and spatial autocorrelations documented above reflect a pattern of complex correlations over both space and time for the unobservables that is hard to approximate by a parametric specification, underscoring the need for flexible, semiparametric controls of the type afforded by the fixed-effects we employ. Further, after controlling for these fixed-effects, the remaining unobservables are not persistent.
Robustness Checks
Finally, we also report on a set of robustness checks on our results. The first, reported in Table   4 , replicates the analysis in Model IV2 (Table 3 ) but with the adoption of the Honda Civic Hybrid as the dependent variable. The rationale for the validity of the installed-base of the Honda Civic as an instrument is that it is not easily observable by consumers. This would be more convincing if it were also the case that the installed-base of the Honda Civic Hybrid does not have any significant effect on the adoption decision for the Honda Civic Hybrid itself. We therefore conduct a similar analysis for the Honda Civic Hybrid, using the installed-base for flex fuel vehicles as instruments (Model R1). We find that the estimated installed-base effect is insignificant, providing some face support to our strategy.
Another set of robustness checks varies the geography for which the installed-base is defined to see if the effects are consistent with social effects. We expect that social effects are stronger when the network is in closer proximity to the focal individual. Thus, a focal consumer is less likely to be affected by changes in installed-base in a geography they are less likely to observe directly. By this logic, if the installed-base is defined at the level of the city, the social effect should be weaker than when it is defined for the zip code, and it should be weaker still if the installed-base is defined at the level of the county. We thus estimate two other models (Models R2 and R3) that respectively define the installed-base at the level of the city and county. The rest of the controls remain the same, including the fixed-effects at the level of a zip code-quarter.
These estimates are reported in Table 5 . We find that the installed-base effects are indeed weaker (although still significant and positive) at the level of the city compared to the zip code level, and they become insignificant at the county level. These results are consistent with social effects that are moderated by geographic contiguity.
We also conducted additional analysis to assess the robustness of our results. We replicated the analysis in Model IV2, but with both city level and county level installed base added to the zip-code level model. The city and county level installed bases for the Prius were instrumented using city and county level installed bases of other hybrid vehicles and flex fuel vehicles. The fixed effects were specified at the zip-quarter level as before. In results not reported here, we find that the zip code and city level installed bases have significant effects, while the county level installed base does not have a significant effect. The magnitude of the installed base effect for the zip code level is 0.0001623 (std. error of 0.0000263) and that at the city level is 2.92e-06 (std. error 1.39e-06). These results provide further support for the case that what we measure are social effects, which are highest for those networks that are closest to the focal individual and reduce with distance (geographical in this case, but could be other measures in other applications).
Other robustness checks that we conducted but do not report here include changing the time level of aggregation for the fixed effects to assess sensitivity to time definitions (six months instead of a quarter); changing the quarter definitions to assess whether sales-agent bonuses or dealer promotions tied to quarterly deadlines affected sales (for example, we recoded quarter 1 from January-March to February-April and so on); and considering the installed base effect from two or three months lags rather than a one month lag to account for the possibility that it takes more than one month for consumers to start observing these cars in their neighborhoods.
In general, we find that these modifications do not substantially change the substantive nature of our results. This campaign, titled the Ford Fiesta Movement involved giving the car away to a hundred people from amongst 4000 applicants for a period of six months. In return, users were asked to sharing their experiences with the car on the Internet (Barry, 2009) . Toyota used a similar social media campaign for the Toyota Prius, based on making the car available to celebrities and encouraging them to drive the car to marquee events such as the Academy Awards ceremonies. The firm's actions suggest social contagion in Prius demand. Many industry observers also opine the Toyota Prius was under-priced initially, pointing to the absence of a price skimming strategy for 5 The results of these robustness checks are available from the authors upon request. the car despite its early scarcity, and despite the long waiting periods consumers faced between order and delivery of the car. A price penetration strategy is optimal in the context of social spillover effects, if early adopters of the product have a positive effect on the purchase decisions of subsequent adopters. Robust measurement of social effects is therefore an important component of evaluating the return-on-investment of such non-conventional marketing campaigns to firms like Toyota.
Implications for Other Settings
Till this point, we emphasized the need to control for correlated unobservables to obtain a credible estimate of causal installed-base effects in the context of a model with social effects.
Similar identification concerns arise in other important contexts of interest to marketers. We outline two such areas our analysis impacts on, viz., measuring state dependent effects and empirical analysis of discrete games of strategic interaction. 
Models with State Dependence
Here, the unobserved heterogeneity θ i are allowed to depend on the demographics vector, d i , via the parametrically specified distribution, f θ|d , and are given a random effects interpretation.
A fixed-effects version of the above model is one where the econometrician does not specify f θ|d but estimates it semiparametrically. Flexibility in specifying f θ|d is important for two reasons.
First, following Heckman (1991), a flexible control for persistent unobserved heterogeneity is necessary to correctly measure causal ("structural") state dependence in demand. Second, unlike the econometrics literature, where interest is typically in the hyperparameters of the distribution of tastes in the population, interest in Marketing is usually on inference on the full distribution of heterogeneity itself as this feeds into the development of micro-marketing and targeting strategies, and its preferable to specify this heterogeneity flexibly. Unfortunately, identification of fixed effects specifications in nonlinear models like above is complicated due to the "incidental parameters" problem: For short panels with fixed T, and N → ∞, maximum likelihood based on (50) is inconsistent for the individual-specific parameters, and this inconsistency transfers even to the common parameters (and slope coefficients) due to the nonlinearity (Neyman and Scott (1948) Chamberlain (2010) ) suggest the logit is the only discrete-choice model where this is possible. Deriving exact bias-correction methods of the type we have outlined is challenging for nonlinear panel data models due to the difficulties in deriving analytically the expression for the bias of the estimators. Arellano and Hahn (2007) review some recent approaches to approximate bias correction in nonlinear panel data models that have lower order bias asymptotically (e.g., of order 1 /T 2 than the 1 /T ). For short panels therefore, either specifying the distribution of heterogeneity parametrically or using approximate bias correction of the type discussed above may be viable approaches, going forward. On the other hand, for longer panels with large T, it is now possible to accommodate specifications with semiparametric specifications for f θ|d .
These rely on T → ∞ asymptotics for consistency. For example, Lenk and Desarbo (2000) ; Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch (2005) and Bajari, Fox, il Kim, and Ryan (2010) to name a few recent papers, propose estimators with semiparametric controls for heterogeneity based on flexible finite mixtures.
Identification in presence of state dependence (or lagged dependent variables more generally)
is also challenging due to two other econometric concerns. The first problem arises from having to handle the initial condition. This is less of a concern in our application because we have data from the introduction of the Prius. In the absence of the initial history, the full likelihood of the model in (50), unconditional on the first observation, y i1 , is,
The difficulty with state dependence is that by construction, the density of y i1 depends on past y-s prior to the sample periods; so all we can say is that f y 1 |x,d,θ should in general depend A second practical problem is induced by the fact that the marketing variables, x it , are often targeted to individuals with some knowledge of their past history, tastes or demographics. To accommodate this nonrandom allocation of targeting, we have to augment the density in (51) with the density of x it |y i,t−1 , d i , θ,
One approach to inference then is to also make parametric assumptions about the density, f x|y,d,θ (e.g., Manchanda, Rossi, and Chintagunta (2004); Otter, Gilbride, and Allenby (2011); van Dijk, van Heerde, Leeflang, and Wittink (2004) ). However, assuming the wrong density in turn, results in additional misspecification bias of unknown form on θ i . 7 Moreover, the nonrandom allocation of x accentuates the difficulty with specifying the initial condition as now, both (y i1 , x i1 ) depend on past history, requiring specifying f y 1 ,x 1 |x,d,θ compared to f y 1 |x,d,θ before (this aspect does not seem to have been noted in the extant literature). Researchers are still working on solutions to these issues, and identification and estimation of dynamic, nonlinear panel models is an area of active econometric inquiry.
Discrete Games of Strategic Interaction Similar issues also arise in the empirical analysis of models built on discrete games of strategic interaction. For instance, in the entry literature, interest is often on estimating the causal effect of the entry decisions of other players on the payoffs of each player using data on entry patterns across markets. More entry is often observed in more attractive markets; hence, unless the "attractiveness" of markets from the player's perspective are fully controlled for, it will appear from estimation that a player is more likely to enter markets where there are more competitors, leading to a counter-intuitive finding of a pervasive taste by players for competition (e.g., Orhun (2012) ).
One solution is to control for market attractiveness semiparametrically by introducing fixed effects that are correlated or common across players within a market. However, then the econo- but common unobservables in these setups remains a significant challenge (see Gallant, Hong, and Khwaja (2010) for one approach).
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the identification and estimation of causal installed-base effects.
Causal installed-base effects may arise from a variety of social effects including word-of-mouth, network effects, herd behavior, observational learning and exclusivity/snobbery. A valid measure of such causal installed-base effects requires controls for confounding factors such as homophily and correlated unobservables. Controlling adequately for homophily and correlated unobservables is now the de facto standard in the literature for empirically establishing the presence of social influence. A robust way to control for these is to specify a rich set of fixed-effects. We address several issues that arise in this specification, most notably, the inconsistency of estimates of installed-base effects in work-horse empirical models of social influence. We characterize the sign and magnitude of the bias.
We present an empirical application to analyzing installed-base effects in the adoption of the Toyota Prius Hybrid car. We use a rich, disaggregate level data-set for the purpose, which allows us to specify a very detailed specification of fixed-effects. We present an instrumental variables method and a new bias-correction method to provide consistent estimates of the installed-base effect. The results of our empirical analysis reveal statistically significant and positive installedbase effects in the adoption of the Toyota Prius. A naive analysis that ignores the bias in the presence of fixed-effects indicates these effects were significantly negative. Thus, the bias changes not just the magnitude of the results, but its sign as well. We find social effects that are economically significant. We conduct a series of robustness checks to establish our estimates are consistent with social effects.
This paper contributes to the literature on identification and estimation of dynamic panel data models, and spatio-temporal models which include lagged aggregations of decisions by other agents as covariates. The bias-correction approach provides a practical method to obtain causal installed-base effects when it is hard to find suitable instruments. We also discuss implications of our results for identification of models in Marketing involving state dependence in demand, and incorporating discrete games of strategic interaction. Extending these ideas to developing robust estimators of causal effects in the context of these nonlinear models, and models with more complex patterns of variation in unobservables (for instance, heteroskedasticity, persistence etc.) is an interesting area for future research. and M X ≡ I −X X X −1X
. We recognize that,
To compute the asymptotic bias in the estimate ofβ first, we note that from Equations ( 
Now, Thus, the within-estimator with covariates is biased, and the asymptotic bias in this case is also negative. The magnitude of the asymptotic bias is similar to that in a model with no covariates, except that the denominator is modified to include the effect of the covariates.
There is an asymptotic bias not just in the within estimator for the installed base effect, but also in the estimator for the vector of coefficients for the other covariates Z, even though Z is exogenous. We next demonstrate this and find the expression for the asymptotic bias of these coefficients. We note from equations A-2 and A-4 that,
Applying ST/MWCMT, we get,
Applying Khintchine's weak law of large numbers,
The second term,
Defining E Z iX i ≡ Σ ZX and with E X iX i = σ 2 X and E X iε i = − Thus, even though the covariates Z are exogenous, the within estimator for their coefficients is not consistent, and the asymptotic bias is given by the expression above. This bias for a particular coefficient can be positive or negative depending on the contents of matrices Σ −1 ZM X Z and Σ ZX .
We now derive the asymptotic properties of s 2 : We now derive the asymptotic biases in the estimates of β, γ and σ 2 ε when using this two stage approach described above. Note thatẐ is exogenous due to the exogeneity of S. Thus, the expressions for the asymptotic bias in the estimates of a model with endogenous covariates in addition to the installed base are very similar to the case with exogenous covariates, except that the covariate is replaced by its fitted value from the first stage. ♣
